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SEXUAL HARASSMENT, PROSTITUTION,
AND THE TORT OF ABUSIVE DISCHARGE:
AN ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION
OF RECENT LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS
JOHN A. GRAY*
"A woman invited to trade herself for a job is in effect being asked
to become a prostitute." I
The purpose of this article is to call attention to and
comment on a recent development in the law of the tort of abusive
discharge that has significant consequences for both plaintiff-
employees and defendant-employers in quid pro quo harassment
cases, specifically the use of state criminal statutes prohibiting
solicitation of prostitution as a basis for the tort of abusive
discharge in instances of statutory quid pro quo sexual
harassment. 2 The result of this development is a possible double
* Professor of Law and Social Responsibility, Sellinger School of Business and
Management, Loyola College in Maryland. I am grateful to Professor Andrea
Gimapetro-Meyer for her thoughtful suggestions.
1 Lucas v. Brown & Root, Inc., 736 F.2d 1202,1205 (8 h Cir. 1984) (applying
Arkansas law allowing a claim of abusive discharge based on the public policy
of an Arkansas statute making prostitution a crime and holding that allowing
such a claim does not circumvent the limitations of Title VII due to its non-
preemption provision).
2 Insignia Residential Corp. v. Ashton, 75 A.2d 1080 (Md. 2000) (holding an
action for abusive discharge may lie when at -will employee is discharged for
refusing to engage in sexual conduct that would violate state law against
prostitution even though the discharge is also unlawful under Federal and state
discrimination laws); Lucas v. Brown & Root, Inc., 736 F.2d 1202 (81h Cir.
1984) (applying Arkansas law allowing a claim of abusive discharge based on
the public policy of an Arkansas statute making prostitution a crime and holding
that allowing such a claim does not circumvent the limitations of Title VII due to
its non- reemption provision); Harrison v. Edison Bros. Apparel Store, 924 F.2d
530 (4 Cir. 1991); Collins v. Rizkana, 652 N.E. 2d 653 (Ohio 1995);
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liability exposure for the employer, once under the equal
employment opportunity (EEO) statute; the other, under the tort
claim. The supervisory employee who is the source of the conduct
is also potentially liable for criminal charges as well as other tort
claims. And if the plaintiff misses the filing datelines for the
statutory claim, the plaintiff still has the longer limitations period
for filing the tort claim. 4 In brief, the tort of abusive discharge may
be available along with an EEO remedy whenever a specific
instance of quid pro quo sexual harassment also simultaneously
violates the public policy embodied in the state criminal law
prohibiting solicitation of prostitution.
This article is divided into three parts. It first distills the
law (a) of employment related sexual harassment, (b) of
solicitation of prostitution, and (c) of the tort of abusive discharge.
It then examines four recent cases on the issue of allowing use of
the tort of abusive discharge in employment situations to vindicate
the public policy of state sex offense statutes. Finally, it makes
concluding comments about this development.
Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem'l Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025 (Ariz. 1985)
(recognizing an action for abusive discharge when at-will employee was
discharged for refusing to engage in an act that would constitute indecent
exposure under Arizona statute), superceded by statute as stated in Chaboya v.
American Nat'l Red Cross, 72 F. Supp. 2d 1081 (D. Ariz. 1999).
3 One use of common law tort claims in discrimination lawsuits is to obtain a
finding of liability and damages against the individual who committed the
discrimination, since the federal equal employment opportunity laws provide a
basis for liability only against the employer-company. Depending on the
circumstances, plaintiff-employees will often plead assault and battery, invasion
of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. In contrast to these
claims which target the individual who actually engaged in the harassing
conduct, the tort of abusive discharge, similar to the EEO statutes, generally
reaches only the employer-company and not the harasser. Adler v. American
Standard Corp., 432 A.2d 464 (Md. 1981).
4 The statute of limitations under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is 180
days, and is the same under Maryland Art. 49B §9A(a), whereas under Maryland
law it is three years for the tort of abusive discharge. Court and Judicial
Proceedings Article, §5- 101, MD. CODE ANN. (1994).
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I. Is quid pro quo sexual harassment also solicitation for
prostitution?
A. Employment related sexual harassment
The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized two kinds of
sexual harassment as constituting illegal gender discrimination in
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 - quid pro quo
harassment and environmental harassment. 5  Quid pro quo
harassment occurs when a supervisory manager makes
acquiescence in his/her unwelcome demands for sexual favors a
condition of receipt of a specific, tangible job benefit, such as
being hired, promoted, transferred, continuation of employment,
6
receiving special assignments or training or pay increases. If the
employee acquiesces, the supervisor grants the specific benefit. If
the employee refuses, the supervisor denies the benefit. Either way
the supervisor's employer is strictly liable for quid pro quo
harassment.
7
5 Meritor Fed. Say. & Loan v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (recognizing both
quid pro quo harassment and environmental harassment as violations of Title
VII); Harris v. Forklift, 510 U.S. 17 (1993) (recognizing the reasonable person
standard as the basis for determining whether unwelcome conduct is sufficiently
pervasive and severe to constitute environmental harassment); Farragher v. City
of Roca Baton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998) and Burlington Mills v. Ellerth, 524 U.S.
742 (1998) (both holding that employers are vicariously liable for supervisory
environmental harassment subject to a twofold employer affirmative defense).
Catherine MacKinnon is usually credited with providing the bedrock legal
analysis of sexual harassment as a systematic and socially pervasive form of
discrimination based on sex. See CATHERINE MACKINNON, SEXUAL
HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN (1979).
6 If these unwelcome demands include requests for sexual intercourse, this form
of quid pro quo harassment may also constitute solicitation of prostitution. See
infra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
7 Meritor, Farragher, and Ellerth cases, supra note 5. See infra notes 35-38 and
accompanying text for the U.S. Supreme Court's use of general agency principles
in the Ellerth case to impose vicarious liability on the employer for quid pro quo
harassment. EEOC guidelines define quid pro quo sexual harassment as follows:
"Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or
physical conduct of sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when (1)
submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or
2000-2001
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Environmental harassment consists of unwelcome conduct
based on one or more of the discriminatory factors8 and is
sufficiently pervasive and severe to constitute a hostile work
environment from a reasonable person's viewpoint considering the
totality of the circumstances. 9 Sexual environmental harassment is
such conduct based on gender. Employers are liable for
environmental harassment engaged in or by supervisory personnel
when the employer fails to prevail on either prong of an affirmative
defense: "(1) that the employer exercised reasonable care to
prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and
(2) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take
advantage of any preventive or corrective oportunities provided
by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise." Po
The Civil Rights Act of 1991" provides for compensatory1 2
and punitive 13 damages 14 to be decided by a jury in disparate
condition of an individual's employment, or (2) submission to or rejection of
such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions
affecting such individual...." 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (a) (2001).
8 Factors under federal EEO laws include race, color, national origin, gender,
religion (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964), age (Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967), and disability (American Disability Act of 1990).
Additional factors under state and local law, depending on the jurisdiction, may
include marital status, sexual orientation, political affiliation, and others.
9 Harris, 510 U.S. at 22-23 (1993). EEOC guidelines suggest a number of
factors to consider in determining whether there is a hostile environment: (1)
whether the conduct was physical or verbal or both, (2) how frequently it was
repeated, (3) whether the conduct was hostile and patently offensive, (4) whether
the harasser was a co-worker or supervisor, (5) whether others joined in
perpetrating the harassment, and (6) whether the harassment was directed at
more than one individual. EEOC Compliance Manual, Sexual Harassment:
EEOC Policy Guidance 323 1.
to Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 76. In both these cases, the
Supreme Court stated that the critical inquiry in determining employer liability is
whether the harassment resulted in "direct economic harm" resulting from a
"tangible employment action. "A tangible employment action constitutes a
significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to
promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision
causing a significant change in benefits." Ellerth, at 761.
" Pub.L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
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treatment' 5 cases in addition to any equitable remedy 16 decided by
the court. By definition, both kinds of sexual harassment are
disparate treatment.
The statute of limitations for a Title VII claim is three
hundred (300) days. 17 If a Title VII claimant fails to file with a
complaint with the federal Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC)' 8 within 300 days, she/he loses the Title VII
action.
12 Compensatory damages serve to make the victim whole again and have
economic and non-economic components. Insurance generally covers defense
expenses and compensatory damages resulting from strict liability and
negligence theories of recovery but not those resulting form reckless or
intentional misconduct. By definition, harassment is intentional misconduct.
Employers can purchase harassment insurance. See BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S.
559, 568 (1996).
13 Punitive damages are awarded to deter the offender and to set an example to
deter others from comparable misconduct. Liability and damages generally must
be proven by clean and convincing evidence. Damages are subject to due
process restraints. BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996). Approximately half
of the states disallow insurance coverage for punitive damages.
14 See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (1994). The combination of non-economic
compensatory damages (e.g. pain and suffering) and any punitive damages is
limited depending on the workforce size of the employer up to a maximum of
three hundred (300) thousand dollars.
1S A disparate treatment case is one of intentional discrimination in the sense that
one or more of the prohibited factors is a substantial contributing factor to the
adverse employment conduct or decision. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
490 U.S. 228 (1989). In contrast, a disparate impact case is one where an
employer uses a non-job related employment requirement that has an adverse
impact on a member of a protected group. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424 (1971). Seven years after the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Supreme
Court first recognized the disparate impact theory in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.
(1971). Twenty years later, Congress codified this theory in the Civil Rights Act
of 1991. See Pub.L.No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
16 Equitable remedies authorized by federal discrimination laws include back pay
up to two years, retroactive seniority, and training, front pay in absence of
reinstatement. Unlike common law remedies, statutory remedies also include
reasonable attorney's fees and legal expenses for prevailing plaintiffs.
'" 42 U.S.C. §706 (e) (1994).
18 The EEOC is the federal enforcement agency established by Congress in 1964
for federal EEO laws, including the Equal Pay Act of 1963, Title VII of the Civil
2000-2001
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Title VII covers all private sector employers with 15 or
more employees.19 Employees working for employers with 14 or
fewer employees have no statutory remedy under Title VII,
although they may have a common law remedy.
20
This article is focused on instances of quid pro quo sexual
harassment where the sexual favor requested by the supervisor
manager is sexual intercourse.
B. Solicitation for Prostitution
Under a state criminal law statute,21 the act of prostitution
and the solicitation of prostitution are crimes. Prostitution is
defined as "the offering or receiving of the body for sexual
intercourse for hire." 22 "For hire" can mean the giving of anything
of value in exchange for the sexual intercourse. "Solicitation" is
not defined in the statute and is to be "read in terms of its ordinary
meaning as understood and used by the general public."
23
Rights Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, and
Title I of the American Disabilities Act of 1990. Civil Right of 1991, Pub. L.
No. 102-166 (1991).
'9 42 U.S.C. § 704(c) (2000). The count includes part-time as well as full-time
employees, temporary and regular.
20 I refer to employers with 14 or fewer employees as statutory small employers.
It has not yet been decided that employees of statutory small employers have
available the tort of abusive discharge to vindicate Title VII's public policy
against discrimination. Maryland's highest court has held that the tort is
available to employees of statutory small employers to vindicate Maryland's
public policy against discrimination. See Molesworth v. Brandon_672 A.2d 616
(1996). See Gray, John A., Statutory Workforce Size Requirement and the Tort
of Abusive Discharge: Small Employers Beware, LAB. L. J. 13-24 (1996). On
the tort of abusive discharge, see infra notes 28 to 36.
21 This section uses Maryland criminal law as illustrative of comparable criminal
law in other states. MD. CODE ANN., [Crime and Punishment] § 15 and 16
(2000). See also McNeil v. State, 739 A.2d 86 (1999), in which the Court traced
the history of the efforts in Maryland to control prostitution and the social
problems generated by the commercialization of that activity.
2 MD. CODE ANN., [Crime and Punishment] §§ 15,16.
2 In Re Appeal No. 180, 365 A.2d 545 (1976). The Maryland Court of Appeals
iterated this meaning of "solicit" in McNeil v. State of Maryland, 739 A.2d 93
(1999), by referring to the definition of "solicit" provided in WEBSTER'S NEW
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"Solicitation" can mean "requesting sexual intercourse in exchange
for something of value." Clearly, the offer of a job, or a
promotion, of even of continuing employment given the at will
employment relationship is "something of value."24 The crime of
solicitation and the crime of prostitution apply to both the party
providing sex for payment and the party receiving the sex in return
for payment. 25  The penalty for soliciting prostitution and for
prostitution is "a fine of not more than $500 or confinement in or
commitment to any penal or reformatory institution in this State for
not more than one year, or to both such fine and imprisonment in
the discretion of the court."26 It is reasonable to assume that at the
time of the enactment of these anti-prostitution laws in the early
1920s, state legislatures did not include in their considerations
what we refer to today as employment related quid pro quo
UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY: 1. To ask or seek earnestly or
pleadingly; to beg to entreat; as, we solicit your support, he solicited them for
help. 2. To tempt or entice another to do wrong. 3. To accost another for some
immoral purpose, as a prostitute does. 4. To disturb, to disquiet. [Rare]. The
Court stated; "Any one of the first three definitions would suffice as an "ordinary
meaning ... understood and used by the general public. Even the third ...
references a solicitation by a prostitute only as an example, not as a limitation...
. An entreaty, or offer, by a potential customer also qualifies as an accosting for
some immoral purpose." Id. at 420.
24 See Lucas v. Brown Root, 736 F.2d 1205 (1" Cir. 1984) for a distinction
between a criminal proceeding in which a job might not be considered a "fee"
within the meaning of a criminal statute and a civil action where no such narrow
interpretation is required or appropriate.
25 McNeil v. State of Maryland, 739 A.2d 85 (1999) (holding that the crime of
soliciting for prostitution stated in the statute covers the conduct of both the
prostitute and his/her agents in soliciting potential customers and of the potential
customer in soliciting the prostitute). Recent changes in some state statutes
recognize situations in which the party providing the sexual intercourse has been
coerced into doing so and thus is to be held blameless. Beverly Balos & Mary
Louise Fellows, A Matter of Prostitution: Becoming Respectable, 24 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 1220 (1999). Under this approach, an acquiescing employee who does not
welcome a supervisor's request for sexual intercourse as a condition of
employment may be held blameless due to the coercion. This articles focuses on
the situation where the employee or applicant rejects the solicitation.
26 MD. CODE ANN. [Crime and Punishment] § 17 (2000).
2000-2001
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harassment. Much less did they consider it to be conduct in
violation of these criminal laws.
27
C. Tort of Abusive Discharge
28
An employer commits the tort of abusive discharge when
its discharge of an employee contravenes a clear mandate of public
policy.29 While the public policy may be found in a constitution,
statute, agency regulation, or court decision, the tort is frequently
applicable in circumstances where the statute whose public policy
has been contravened itself does not provide a remedy to vindicate
it.3° Typical examples of this tort are when an employer fires an
employee in retaliation for the employee's refusal (1) to commit an
illegal act, 31 (2) to forgo some statutory employment related right,32
or (3) to forgo some important civic responsibility. 33 Also in
27 Significant contemporary scholarship is analyzing anti-violence legal reforms
in the areas of domestic abuse, sexual harassment, and rape over the last three
decades. Balos & Fellows, supra note 25, in which the authors describe how
domestic abuse, sexual harassment, and rape are interrelated and how
prostitution figures into these forms of sexual violence and into the laws that
address them, and in which they propose the creation of a civil remedy to
address the inequality perpetuated by prostitution as well as the amendment of
criminal statutes so that persons used in prostitution are no longer penalized.
28 Also referred to as wrongful or retaliatory discharge and as the Public Policy
exception to the At-Will Employment Doctrine.
29 Adler v. American Standard Corp., 432 A.2d 464 (1981) (recognizing a cause
in action in tort for abusive discharge when the motivation for the discharge
contravenes a clear mandate of public policy). The public policy can derive from
stature, judicial decision, constitution, or administrative regulation. Id. at 38.
30 Makovi v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 561 A.2d 179 (1989) (holding that an action
for abusive discharge will not lie when the public policy violated by the
discharge arises from a statute that provides its own remedy for the violation).
Watson v. People's Ins. Co., 588 A.2d 760 (1991) (holding that an abusive
discharge may lie when there are multiple sources of public policy and at least
one violated by the discharge arises from a law that does not provide its own
remedy for the violation).
31 For commentary and examples, see STANLEY MAZAROFF, MARYLAND
EMPLOYMENT LAW §5.1 (B)(1) (1990 and 1994 Cumulative Supplement).
321 d. at B(3).
33 Id. at B(2).
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abusive discharge cases, only the employer is liable and not the
harassing supervisor.34 The cases this article considers fall into the
first group, viz., discharging an employee in retaliation for that
employee's refusal to commit an illegal act, specifically an act of
prostitution.
In abusive discharge cases, typically the motivation of the
supervisory manager in some way serves the interest of the
employer. That is, the illegal act demanded or the demand that
some statutory employment right or civic responsibility be forgone
is something that in some way benefits the employer; even
discriminating on the basis of gender may be seen as in some way
benefiting the employer.35 This motivation for the supervisory
manager's action provides a basis for imputing liability to the
employer. The question arises whether the tort should be available
where the supervisor's motivation is purely personal and in no way
serves any interest of the employer. In the Ellerth case, the
Supreme Court, in its effort to apply common law agency
principles pursuant to legislative intent as the basis for employer
liability under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
acknowledged that sexual harassment by a supervisor generally is
outside the scope of employment and therefore not imputable to the
employer under the doctrine of respondeat superior.36 The Court,
however, used the general common law of agency stated in the
Restatement (Second) of Agency to affirm an employer's vicarious
liability for a supervisor's sexual harassment resulting in an adverse
tangible employment action against an employee. The Restatement
Id. at 13. "We believe the Adler court did not intend to create an additional
cause of action for wrongfully discharged employees against an individual
officer of a corporation, at least where the evidence does not show that the
officer was clothed with the essential attributes of an employer."
35 In Molesworth v. Brandon, 672 A.2d 608 (1996), the plaintiff, a veterinarian,
convinced a jury that her employer fired her, in part because the clients did not
want a woman veterinarian working on their horses.
36 "Only conduct motivated at least in part by a motive to serve the employer
may confer liability on the employer." See supra note 5, at 756. "Therefore,
because "sexual harassment under Title VII presupposes intentional conduct," an
employer may be liable only for harassment intended to further the employer's
business. Id. "The general rule is that sexual harassment by a supervisor is not
conduct within the scope of employment. Id. at 757.
2000-2001
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(Second) of Agency §219 (2)(d) states that "a master is not
subject to liability for the torts of his servants acting outside the
scope of their employment unless ... the servant ... was aided in
accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation."
37
The Court stated that "The aided in the agency relation standard ...
requires the existence of something more than the employment
relation itself.
3 8
Every Federal Court of Appeals to consider the
question has found vicarious liability when a
discriminatory act results in a tangible employment
action. . . . In Meritor we acknowledged this
consensus .... When a supervisor makes a tangible
employment decision, there is assurance the injury
could not have been inflicted absent the agency
relation. A tangible employment action in most
cases inflicts direct economic harm. As a general
proposition, only a supervisor ... can cause this sort
of injury. . . . Tangible employment actions fall
within the special province of the supervisor . . .
[and] are the means by which the supervisor brings
the official power of the enterprise to bear on
subordinates. A tangible employment decision
requires an official act of the enterprise, a company
act ... [and] becomes for Title VII purposes the act
of the employer. Whatever the exact contours of the
aided in the agency relation standard, its
requirements will always be met when a supervisor
takes a tangible employment action against a
subordinate.
39
The same approach is applicable to a challenge to imputing
liability to the employer under the tort of abusive discharge when
the conduct demanded by the supervisor in no way serves any
imaginable interest of the employer.
37 d. at 760-63.
381 d. at 760.
39 1d. at 761-63.
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II. Cases allowing tort of abusive discharge even though EEO
law also provides a remedy.
At least four states (Maryland, Arkansas, North Carolina,
and Ohio) have recognized the availability of the tort of abusive
discharge to vindicate a public policy independent of federal and
state discrimination statutes that is violated by conduct that also is
quid pro quo sexual harassment. Establishing the tort in these
circumstances requires establishing by a preponderance of the
evidence that (1) there was a discharge, (2) that it was motivated by
the employee's refusal to engage in sexual intercourse in exchange
for a tangible, valuable job-related favor, (3) that conditioning the
tangible employment benefit on acquiescing to the unwelcome
request for sexual intercourse would be an act in violation of the
state's public policy against solicitation of prostitution,40 and (4)
that the criminal statute did not provide a civil remedy to the
plaintiff to vindicate the statute's public policy. Tort remedies
include compensatory4' and punitive damages to be decided by a
jury. The statute of limitations for a tort is generally three years
from when its victim knew or had reason to know of its
commission.42
The significance of the availability of the tort of abusive
discharge to victims of quid pro quo harassment in violation of
Title VII and state EEO law is that it either creates another liability
for the employer along with its EEO liability or, in the event that
the employee-plaintiff did not meet the EEO law's statute of
limitations, provides a common law remedy. Clearly, employers
do not favor any common law development making this tort
available for quid pro quo sexual harassment. And, equally clearly,
employee potential victims of quid pro harassment welcome this
40 For example, based on the Maryland Statute, MD. ANN. CODE, Art. 27 §§ 15
and 16.
41 Compensatory remedies include an economic component and a quality of life
component and essentially are not overturn-able on review. Punitive damages
are subject to constitutional limits under the Due Process Clause of the 14th and
5th Amendments. See BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996) establishing
guidelines to determine constitutionally excessive punitive damages.
42 MD. ANN. CODE, Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, § 501.
2000-2001
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development. Under this development, employees may be able to
choose to file either a Title VII claim or a tort claim or both the
statutory and common law claims.
Maryland. In Insignia Residential Corp. v. Ashton,43
Maryland's highest court recognized an action for abusive
discharge when an at-will employee was discharged for refusing to
engage in sexual conduct that would violate state law against
prostitution, even though the discharge also constituted unlawful
quid pro quo sexual harassment in violation of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and of its Maryland counterpart, Article
49B, each of which provides a civil remedy.4"
Ms. Ashton contended that she was discharged for her
refusal to engage in sexual intercourse with one of Insignia's
officials, Michael Coleman. She contended that Mr. Coleman's
conduct, which she regarded as a form of quid pro quo sexual
harassment, also violated another clear mandate of public policy
independent of the federal and state EEO laws, namely that against
solicitation of prostitution articulated in the Maryland Code,
Article 27, § 15 (e).45 The case proceeded to trial only on two
counts - a claim of battery against Michael Coleman and a
wrongful discharge claim against Insignia.46 The jury found that
Coleman had not intentionally and offensively touched Ms. Ashton
and thus returned a verdict for him on the battery. The jury,
however, did find that Ms. Ashton was terminated from
employment for her refusal to engage in sexual intercourse with
Mr. Coleman and awarded $22, 240.00 in damages. 47
[Michael] Coleman's entreaties, she avers,
constituted a solicitation for her to engage in
prostitution, as defined in § 16 -- to offer her body
for sexual intercourse for hire -- but there is no
4' 755 A.2d 1080 (Md. 2000).
44id.
45 MD. CODE ANN., Art. 27, §15(e) 1957. Unlawful Acts, states: "It shall be
lawful: ... (e) ... to solicit ... for the purpose of prostitution ......
46 755 A.2d 1080. There is nothing in the case regarding any EEO claim.
47 755 A.2d at 1083.
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other civil remedy available to her for the loss of her
employment due to her resistance to that entreaty.48
On appeal, Maryland's highest court held that Maryland
recognizes a wrongful discharge cause of action when an employee
is discharged in retaliation for refusing a supervisor's request for
sexual intercourse even when a civil remedy for quid pro quo
harassment is also available under an EEO statute for the same
misconduct. The tort is available to provide a civil remedy to the
victim to vindicate the public policy of the state criminal statute
prohibiting solicitation of prostitution. The Court cited Lucas v.
Brown & Root, Inc.,49 approvingly: "Sometimes the facts
underlying a discharge constitute both a violation of an anti-
discrimination statute and of another, more narrowly focused,
statute reflecting clear public policy but providing no civil
remedy. 50
The statute precluding prostitution and attempts to induce
or coerce women and men into engaging in prostitution represents
a clear mandate of public policy that is violated when an at-will
employee is discharged for refusing to engage in conduct that
would constitute prostitution or lewdness or assignation, which is
also prohibited by § 15 of Article 27. The fact that both the
inducements themselves and a discharge for rejecting them may
constitute a violation of the Federal and State employment
discrimination laws does not require that we ignore that such
conduct also violates the entirely separate, independently based,
public policy embodied in § 15. 5'
The Court does not assume that every incident of quid pro quo
sexual harassment automatically equates with a solicitation of
prostitution. The issue articulated by Insignia, as appellant, is much
broader - whether Maryland recognizes a wrongful discharge
action based on a theory that the employee was wrongfully
terminated "because she refused to acquiesce to 'quid pro quo'
48 Id. at 1081.
9 736 F.2d 1202 (8 t" Cir. 1984); see infra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
'0 Id. at 1084.
5' Id. 1087.
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sexual harassment. Ms. Ashton phrases the question as whether an
action lies when the employee is terminated " because she refused
to become her boss's prostitute." Ashton's statement of the issue...
is the more appropriate one. .. "Quid pro quo sexual harassment "
covers a wide range of conduct, much of which might not fall
under Article 27, §§ 15 and 16. And, although the answer may be
the same with respect to some of that penumbral conduct, that
issue is not before us in this case, and we do not address it.52
In a concurring opinion, Associate Justice Eldridge,
referring to the "strained route of relying on the criminal statute
making it unlawful 'to engage in prostitution,"' 53 took the position
that the tort of abusive discharge is always available to vindicate
EEO public policy even when the EEO statutory remedy is also
available.5
An employee . . . who is discharged from her
employment because she refuses to engage in sexual
intercourse with one of her employer's officials,
clearly has a common law cause of action in tort for
abusive discharge.... [and] that common law cause
of action . . . should not be precluded simply
because there may exist limited statutory remedies
under the Human Relations Article of the Maryland
Code (Art. 49B) or Title VII, particularly because
this Court has held that the Art. 49 B and Title VII
remedies are neither exclusive nor primary. 55
For Associate Justice Eldridge, there is no need to rely on another
statute's public policy.
The two dissenting Associate Justices rejected reliance on
the public policy of the anti-prostitution criminal statute because in
their view unwelcome supervisory requests for sexual favors as a
12 id. at 1081, n.1.
3 d. 1087-1088.
54 E.g. "Always available" in the sense that a plaintiff may use the tort claim
along with the statutory claim whenever a discharge violates EEO public policy;




condition of employment are not the "solicitation of prostitution"
that the state legislature had in mind when it enacted the criminal
stature.
Under the majority's reasoning, a person declining a sexual
entreaty "until the ring is on my finger," is a prostitute or a person
requesting sexual activity, promising marriage, or any other
number of things in return, is soliciting prostitution. With its
opinion, the majority, by logical inferential extension, has, I fear,
turned millions of Marylanders into prostitutes or those who solicit
prostitution. Whatever the majority and others think prostitution is,
this, in vernacular language, "ain't it."
56
Arkansas. In Lucas v. Brown & Root, Inc., 7 the federal
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, applying Arkansas
common law, held that Ms. Lucas, an-at will employee, could use
the tort of abusive discharge when she claimed that she had been
fired because she refused to sleep with her foreman. The Eighth
Circuit affirmed the dismissal of her Title VII claim because it was
filed too late, but reversed the dismissal of her state common law
claims. The Eighth Circuit recognized that Arkansas has accepted
the public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine. It
noted that the Arkansas criminal statute prohibiting prostitution
and solicitation of prostitution established a clear mandate of
public policy. "Prostitution is a crime denounced by statute. It is
defined as follows: A person commits prostitution if in return for,
or in expectation of a fee, he engages in or agrees or offers to
engage in sexual activity with any other person."58  The court
reasoned
It is at once apparent that the shoe fits. A woman invited to
trade herself for a job is in effect being asked to become a
prostitute. If this were a criminal prosecution, it might be argued
56 Id. at 1088 (Cathell, J. & Harrel, J. dissenting).
5' 736 F.2d 1202 (8h Cir. 1984). The plaintiff's Title VII claim was dismissed
as untimely because it was filed on the 91" day after plaintiff received her right-
to-sue letter. The Court of appeals also sustained plaintiff's contract and
intentional infliction of emotional distress theories of recovery.
58 Id. at 1205 (citing ARK. STAT. ANN. §41-3002(1) (Supp. 1983)).
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that a job is not a "fee" within the meaning of this statute, and a
court, applying the maxim that criminal statutes are to be strictly
construed, might agree, holding that "fee" means only money, and
not other things of value. But in this civil action no such narrow
interpretation is required or appropriate. A wage-paying job is
logically and morally indistinguishable from the payment of cash.
Indeed, it necessarily involves the payment of cash. Plaintiff should
not be penalized for refusing to do what the law forbids.5 9
The court rejected the employer's argument that allowance
of use of the tort of abusive discharge would circumvent the
limitations of Title VII.
Defendant argues that recognizing this wrongful discharge
claim would allow plaintiff to circumvent Title Vl's limitation
provisions. Title VII does not, however, "exempt or relieve any
person from any liability, duty, penalty, or punishment provided by
an present or future law of an State or political subdivision of a
State, other than any such law which purports to require or permit
the doing of any act which would be an unlawful employment act
under this title.6°
North Carolina. In Harrison v. Edison Bros. Apparel
Store, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals applying North
Carolina common law held that an at-will employee who claimed
that she has been fired for not acquiescing to the sexual demands of
her employer could use the tort of abusive discharge. North
Carolina recognized the public policy exception to the at-will
employment doctrine. North Carolina had a statute criminalizing
prostitution and the solicitation of prostitution. The Fourth Circuit
held that "the exchange of sexual intercourse for the valuable
economic benefit of a job fits within North Carolina's criminal
prohibition" and that the plaintiff was fired for refusing to commit
a criminal act and therefore stated a claim for wrongful discharge. 62
59 1d. at 1205.
60Id. at 1025- 1206; 42 U.S.C. §2000e-7.
61 924 F.2d 530, 533 (4' Cir. 1991).
62 Id. at 534.
VOL. IX
SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Ohio. 63 In Collins v. Rizkana,64 the plaintiff sued her former
employer for wrongful discharge based on sexual harassment.
Collins v. Rizkana is interesting in that it includes a number of
dimensions. The plaintiff was bared from a statutory remedy under
the Ohio EEOC statute because of small workforce size,65 and
instead of simply adopting the same approach as the Maryland
Court in Molesworth v. Brandon66 to which the Ohio court
referred, it based its allowance of the tort on multiple statutory
sources of public policy. The Supreme Court of Ohio held that a
tort cause of action could be brought for wrongful discharge where
the motivation for the discharge contravened the clear pubic policy
against sexual harassment.
The Supreme Court of Ohio found two independent sources
of public policy: (1) the state's criminal laws prohibiting sexual
imposition and offensive sexual contact and prohibiting
prostitution, and (2) the state's equal employment opportunity
statute.
In order to more fully effectuate the state's declared public
policy against sexual harassment, the employer must be denied his
generally unlimited right to discharge an employee at will, where
the reason for the dismissal (or retaliation resulting in constructive
discharge) is the employee's refusal to be sexually harassed.
Although there may have been no actual crime committed, there is
nevertheless a violation of public policy to compel an employee to
forgo his or her legal protections or to do an act ordinarily
prescribed by law. 67
63 This section relies on the analysis originally presented in Gray, supra note 5,
at 17-18.
6652 N.E.2d 653 (1995).
65 Id. at 661. She did not file a claim with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission
since at no time did her employer employ four or more persons, the statutory
requirement.
6 Molesworth, 672 A.2d 608 (recognizing the availability of the tort of abusive
discharge to employees of statutory small employers for discharges violative of
Maryland's public policy against discrimination in employment in the absence of
a statutory remedy due to small workforce size).
6'7 652 N.E.2d at 658 (1995).
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The court concluded that "in cases of multiple-source
public policy, the statute containing the right and remedy will not
foreclose recognition of the tort on the basis of some other source
of public policy, unless it was the legislature's intent in enacting the
statute to pre-empt common law remedies."
68
The Ohio Court's reliance on sex offense statutes as an
independent source of public policy is important, since every state
has comparable sex offense statutes. If other state courts find this
Court's "more fully effectuate" approach convincing, any employee
without a statutory remedy whose discharge is related to sexual
harassment has a tort theory of recovery.
In summary, these four states allow employee-plaintiffs to
use the tort of abusive discharge to vindicate the public policy of
the state's criminal sex offense statute when unwelcome
supervisory requests for sexual intercourse as a condition of
employment result in a discharge for refusing to comply or in a
constructive discharge. 69 Theoretically, this tort is available
regardless of whether the plaintiff-employee also has a statutory
claim under the state or federal EEO law, since the public policy of
the criminal sex offense statute is distinct from and independent of
that of the EEO law. In these four states, theoretically, an employer
may have a twofold liability exposure based on the same
supervisory misconduct - one, at common law; the other, under the
EEO statute.
III. Comments
What are these courts doing by making available to
plaintiff-employees the tort of abusive discharge? They are
recognizing that requiring an employee to give sex in exchange for
having a job is in essence no different than soliciting prostitution.
In making the tort available, these courts are providing a way to
those who have a right not to be a victim of solicitation to vindicate
" Id. at 660.
69 Courts recognize a constructive discharge when an employer deliberately
changes the working conditions with the result that a reasonable person finds
them intolerable and quits.
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the public policy underlying the criminal prostitution statute. The
public policy underlying the criminal statute's prohibition against
the giving of sexual intercourse in exchange for something of value
is one of public morality regarding the nature and uses of sex, viz.
that intimate, sexual relations, even in private between consenting
adults, are not to be a matter of commerce because their purpose is
to express love and to beget children within marriage. To allow
the sale of sexual intercourse is to undermine marital fidelity and to
cheapen sexuality. The public policy underling the crime of
solicitation of prostitution is the prevention of prostitution itself by
also outlawing the invitation to prostitution. 70 Just as this conduct
is against the law on the streets, it should also be against the law in
the workplace. Just as prostitution is against the law, even if
carried out without any coercion whatsoever as a purely voluntary
exchange, so also, a fortiori, it should be against the law when a
supervisor in a position of power coerces sexual intercourse from
an employee in need of a job. In addition to undermining the
public morality in favor of sex in marriage and in favor of sex as a
voluntary, mutual gift and against sex as a commodity, the
solicitation of prostitution in the workplace undermines the values
that are critical to an efficient, effective, work environment, viz.,
that work and its rewards and burdens are assigned on the basis of
work-related productivity, ability, and seniority
Having said all this, the question still remains as to the
wisdom of making the tort of abusive discharge available against
an employer for the situations found in the four cases considered.
In none of the four cases - Ashton, Lucas, Harrison, Collins - was
there a viable federal or state discrimination claim, but not because
of the underlying facts. Discrimination in employment claims
were not available because the plaintiffs had either failed to file the
federal or state claim in a timely way as in Lucas, or, as in Collins,
the small size of the workforce precluded a statutory remedy. In
70 Often prostitution may not be a voluntary exchange from the side of the
prostitute except in the most superficial sense. The prostitute may be in a
position of being coerced to sell sexual intercourse, either by a third party, or by
a situation of economic destitution without any realistic alternative to make a
living.
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these cases, one could still file a criminal complaint against the
supervisor. And in Maryland, in statutory small employer
situations, one can bring a tort of abusive discharge to vindicate the
statutory public policy against discriminatory discharges. 7'
These cases raise a number of questions. One question is
whether the courts would allow two awards based on two theories
of recovery against an employer for the same misconduct by a
supervisory employer. Theoretically, under the reasoning of these
four courts, a plaintiff can bring an abusive discharge claim against
the employer along with a statutory discrimination claim which is
still viable because within the statutory limitations period and/or
workforce size requirement. By doing so, the plaintiff is
vindicating two distinct and independent public policies - one
against prostitution, the other against discrimination in
employment. Also, theoretically, for example, in Maryland, an
employee of a employer with a workforce less than the statutory
minimum can bring a tort of abusive discharge cause of action
against the employer to vindicate the public policy of the EEO
statute and simultaneously another tort of abusive discharge action
to vindicate the public policy of the criminal prostitution statue.
A follow-up question is how to award damages under each
theory in situations where the courts allow both the tort and
statutory theories to be used against the employer. One answer is
to award damages first under the discrimination statute. Then one
would award some amount to the plaintiff under the tort theory to
compensate for the injury suffered as a victim of solicitation of
prostitution not already compensated by the statutory remedy (e.g.,
loss of wages) for discrimination in employment. In situations
where the plaintiff allows the statute of limitations to run under the
discrimination statutes (300 days), under the reasoning of these
courts the plaintiff-employee still has available another two years
to bring the tort cause of action.
Employers understandably think that a body of federal and
state employment discrimination laws with well-defined
enforcement mechanisms and remedies are in place. They are not
71 Molesworth, 672 A.2d at 608.
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going to be sympathetic to former employees who fail to meet
filing deadlines.
The law in Maryland is one specific example. One way to
deal with the questions raised by these cases is for the Maryland
General Assembly to amend the Maryland EEO statute (1) to
extend its administrative enforcement scheme and statutory
remedies to all employers in Maryland regardless of workforce size
and (2) to make its remedies the exclusive remedies for any
discriminatory workplace conduct, including quid pro quo
harassment.72 This approach would also provide to employees of
statutory small employers a statutory remedy for any violations of
Maryland's EEO statute (e.g., discriminatory failures to hire or
promote or train) rather than the tort remedy only for
discriminatory discharges. This approach will require greater
resources for the state enforcement agency instead of the tort
approach of shifting the enforcement cost to private parties.
7 3
This approach also eliminates the use of criminal sex
offense statutes to provide a remedy in those quid pro quo
harassment situations consisting of unwelcome supervisory
requests for sexual intercourse as a condition of employment and
where the employee has no statutory remedy because of missing
the filing deadline. The way to vindicate the public policy
expressed by criminal sex offense statutes is to file criminal
charges against the harassing supervisor instead of an abusive
discharge claim against the employer. With regard to the problem
created by late filings under the EEO statutes, the legislature had
reasons to adopt specific deadlines for filing. To allow employee
complainants to obtain relief based on the public policy of some
72 Statutory remedies under Maryland Article 49B currently are only equitable
and do not include compensatory and punitive damages to be decided by a jury.
The Maryland statute should also be amended to have its damage awards mirror
those in the federal anti-discrimination laws.
73 Molesworth, 627 A.2d at 705. The Maryland Court of Appeals held that "the
legislative intent for the adoption of the number 'fifteen' as the cut-off for
employers whose employees had statutory remedies was the legislature's desire
to protect the enforcement agency from being overwhelmed by complaints if it
lowered or eliminated the number. An obvious alternative is to provide adequate
enforcement resources."
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other statute is to circumvent the legislature's intent. If statutory
filing deadlines are a problem, it should be addressed directly by
amending the statute accordingly. The common law should not go
out of its way to provide a remedy for someone who did not take
advantage of the statutory remedy available.
